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Linking promotion strategies for RES-E and CO2 reduction in a liberalised 
power market: Is a simultaneous policy necessary? 
 
Claus Huber1 and Poul Erik Morthorst2 
 
Abstract 
Three important issues with respect to the integration of different renewable energy sources into the liberalised 
European electricity market and the international condition of GHG-reduction will be investigated in this paper.  
First, it will be analysed how most important promotion schemes (feed-in tariffs, quota systems ) for different 
renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES -E) interact with the liberalised market.  
Second, the influence of the restriction of the greenhouse gas emissions on the electricity generation and the 
international electricity market price will be discussed.  
Third, the interaction of RES -E, conventional electricity generation and GHG-reduction with the three markets, 
for physical power, green certificates and emission trading will be analysis , i.e. it will be evaluated how new 
environmental markets, such as tradable emission allowances may affect or overlap with the promotion of RES .  
Special focus will be given on the effect of national GHG-reduction as well as on the effects for the producer and 
consumer, respectively. 
A number of policy recommendations in relation to the integration of the three markets and trade-offs between 
technologies and promotion schemes will be made.  
 
1 Introduction 
The power market within the European Union and other countries around the world is, 
currently, in high transition. The reason is threefold, namely:  
First, due to the liberalisation process of the mostly restrict regulated conventional electricity 
market in the past. According to the European Commission (EC, 1997a) the driving forces of 
this process, which started during the last decade, is the goal to maximise the efficiency of the 
electricity supply sector and to reduce consumer prices.  
Second, increasing the share of renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES-E) 
has a high priority in the energy strategies of the European Commission (and other countries). 
The ‘White Paper on Renewable Sources of Energy‘ (EC, 1997b) as well as the ‘RES-E 
Directive‘ (European Parliament and Council, 2001), set essential goals to double the share of 
renewables in the electricity generation mix of EU countries by 2010. For example, the EU-
directive including a proposal on the share of renewable in the individual member states in 
2010, based on the percentage of each country’s consumption of electricity. Although not 
binding it seems that these indicative targets by now are accepted by the EU member states. 
As the EU-directive fails to indicate, which promotion schemes should be used to reach these 
goals, different strategies have to be derived; see e.g. Haas et at (2001) or Huber et at (2001a). 
Most promising instruments are guaranteed feed- in tariffs for electricity produced from RES 
and a quota system for RES-E generation. To facilitate the fulfilment of the quota obligation 
and to increase the cost efficiency of this instrument tradable green certificates (TGC) should 
be connected to the quota. This means, that the quota is the regulation instrument, whereas the 
TGC are used by the market actors to fulfil the quota.  
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Third, most industrial countries have consented to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions under the Kyoto protocol. The European Union has agreed on a common GHG 
reduction of 8% in the period 2008-2012 compared to the emission level of 1990. According 
to the agreed burden sharing within the European Union this overall EU-target is converted 
into national GHG reduction-targets for each of the member states. Thus, some of the member 
states will have to reduce their GHG-emissions significantly in the above-mentioned time-
period, while others are allowed to increase their emissions, mostly on account of a required 
economic development. In this way the EU bubble is translated into a set of national 
commitments, calling for country specific strategies to comply with their Kyoto commitment. 
In parallel with national emission reduction initiatives, however, common EU policies for 
GHG emission reductions are considered. In December 2002 it has been decided to introduce 
an EU-wide GHG allowance trading scheme for the power industry and other energy 
intensive industries (EC, 2001). The core idea of such a system is to ensure that GHG 
reductions in the included sectors are undertaken in the most cost-efficient manner. This 
means that actual GHG-reductions will mainly take place in those countries with the highest 
reduction potentials and the lowest costs. In this way the tradable emission allowances 
(TEAs) will help ensuring that the EU member countries achieve the Kyoto greenhouse gas 
reduction targets as cheap as possible. 
Hence, summing up, the EU has three parallel core goals, namely:  
· to bring down consumer prices 
· to promote RES-E generation  
· to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.  
In setting efficient framework conditions in order to fulfil the different goals, it is necessary to 
consider interactions between the contributing markets and thus the effects of different goals. 
For example a rise in the share of RES-E generation results in lower conventional power 
production. This leads to a decrease in the total amount of GHG-emissions. Therefore, RES-E 
promotion schemes have the positive effect of lower emissions and, hence, serve as GHG 
instrument too. Similar, an introduction of a GHG emission target favours RES-E 
technologies, because production costs from conventional fossil power plants raises due to the 
scarcity of emissions allowances. As a result, the market share assigned to RES-E generation 
increases. In addition, while a higher share of RES-E leads to a break down in the 
conventional spot market price3, a GHG-target drives the spot market price upwards. How 
these schemes and the corresponding markets interact with each other is not a trivial matter.  
This paper analyse these interactions, and tries to give the reader an understanding of how 
markets interact. In more detail three important issues with respect to the integration of 
different renewable energy sources into the liberalised conventional electricity market and the 
international condition of GHG-reduction will be investigated.  
First, it will be analysed how most important promotion schemes for different renewable 
energy technologies for electricity generation – namely feed-in tariffs and quota systems with 
tradable green certificates - interact with the liberalised conventional electricity market.  
Second, the linkage of different CO2-targets with and the effects of the allocation of the 
corresponding tradable emission allowances on the liberalised power market will be 
investigated.  
                                                 
3 Note the total effect of RES-E promotion strategies is, however, ambiguous, i.e. the total costs for the consumer 
(both conventional electricity and RES-E) could be either higher or lower than without a RES-E policy. For 
more details see Jensen and Skytte (2003) 
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Third, the interactions  of RES-E, conventional electricity generation and GHG-reduction with 
the three markets, for physical power, tradable green certificates and GHG emission 
allowances will be investigated, i.e. it will be evaluated how new environmental markets, 
such as an international market for GHG emission allowances may affect or overlap with the 
promotion of RES-E.  
In the analysis special concern is given in working out the consequences for the national 
GHG-reduction policy as well as the costs for the consumer pursuing the achievement of the 
goals. To facilitate the understanding, the investigation will be illustrated by a four countries / 
utilities example.  
 
2 Model assumptions and conditions set in the numerical example  
Before the interactions of different policies can be investigated, the main assumptions of the 
model are described. It is assumed that the following three general conditions are fulfilled.  
· All considered countries have entrance to the same physical electricity market. In 
addition, there are no barriers for export/import of electricity between the countries.  
· In the case of import / export of electricity GHG-emission adjustments are taken 
place.  
· Electricity consumption is assumed to be constant and do not depend on the price 
level, i.e. the price-elasticity is zero.4 
Table 1: Model specifications in the numerical four country example 
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 
 Demand: 110 TWh Demand: 110 TWh Demand: 40 TWh Demand: 40 TWh 
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 €/MWh TWh tCO2/ 
MWh 
€/MWh TWh tCO2/ 
MWh 
€/MWh TWh tCO2/ 
MWh 
€/MWh TWh tCO2/ 
MWh 
Conv. 1 25,0 20 0,80 28,0 60 1,00 28,0 10 0,90 28,0 22 0,90 
Conv. 2 28,0 30 1,00 31,0 38 0,40 29,0 14 0,85 32,5 22 0,38 
Conv. 3 32,0 40 0,50 37,0 62 0,60 31,5 8 0,40 36,0 4 0,65 
Conv. total  90   160   32   48  
RES-E 1 15,0 24 0,00 65,0 5 0,00 10,0 14 0,00 55,0 7 0,00 
RES-E 2 65,0 24 0,00 70,0 6 0,00 68,0 22 0,00 69,0 14 0,00 
RES-E 3 100,0 42 0,00 98,0 9 0,00 95,0 12 0,00 90,0 11 0,00 
RES-E total  90   20   48   32  
 
As already mentioned above, a numerical example considering four countries will be used to 
illustrate the consequences of a certain policy on both national and international level.5 Used 
specifications with respect to the generation costs and the specific CO2-emissions are 
summarised in Table 1. It is assumed that two big countries (country 1 and 2) and two small 
ones exist. For each country three options to generate electricity by conventional fossil power 
plants and three options to generate electricity by RES-E are available. In addition, it is 
assumed that one big (country 1) and one small country (country 3) possesses a high(er) RES-
                                                 
4 In reality, small negative price elasticity can be observed.  
5 Consider: By replacing the name ‘country 1’ by ‘utility 1’, etc, the influence of different policy schemes on 
regional and national level, respectively, can be show.  
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E potential. Note that all data used in the numerical example are constructed, but especially 
with respect to cost curves caution is taken to make these ‘relatively’ close to the observed 
reality. 
National conventional electricity market 
Assuming, first, that the four countries are not connected by an international grid or import / 
export of electricity is (via political constraints) not possible.6 Hence, each country has to 
fulfil the electricity demand by them. Obviously, depending on the national electricity supply 
structure, different national market prices occur. The average weighed electricity price is 
33,83 €/MWh, see Table 2.  
Table 2: National conventional electricity market 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
electricity conventional electricity  [TWh] 86,0 110,0 26,0 40,0 262,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 24,0 0,0 14,0 0,0 38,0 
  Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
  CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 64,0 82,4 21,7 26,6 194,7 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 32,00 37,00 31,50 32,50  
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 2.492 3.302 749 1.201 7.744 
costs  RES-E [M€] 360 0 140 0 500 
  generation costs  [M€] 2.852 3.302 889 1.201 8.244 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 668 768 371 99 1.906 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 3.520 4.070 1.260 1.300 10.150 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 32,00 37,00 31,50 32,50 33,83 
 
Liberalised conventional electricity market 
Allow international electricity trade between the suppliers among the different countries one 
of the major energy goals of the EC can be pursued, namely the reduction of consumer prices. 
The consequence of an international market is that total generation costs in the considered 
countries can be reduced, due to a higher (and cheaper) available portfolio of generation 
units. Neglecting any existing import / export barriers electricity generation costs can be 
minimised.7  
Table 3: Liberalised conventional electricity market 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 90,0 98,0 32,0 42,0 262,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 24,0 0,0 14,0 0,0 38,0 
  Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] -4,0 12,0 -6,0 -2,0 0,0 
  CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 66,0 75,2 24,1 27,4 192,7 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 32,50 
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 2.620 2.858 938 1.266 7.682 
costs  RES-E [M€] 360 0 140 0 500 
  generation costs  [M€] 2.980 2.858 1.078 1.266 8.182 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 725 327 417 99 1.568 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 3.575 3.575 1.300 1.300 9.750 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 32,50 32,50 32,50 32,50 32,50 
 
In most cases the market extension leads to a cost reduction for the consumer too. This 
constrain, however, is not automatically guaranteed. While consumer in countries with an 
expensive generation bases and, hence, high prices gains from the liberalisation, customers in 
                                                 
6 This case should be served as reference case. 
7 In the real world economic inefficiencies exists, due to insufficient grid extension among the countries. 
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countries with a cheap electricity production structure must expect that the electricity prices 
raises. Obviously, the total CO2-emissions changes too, due to the different portfolio. In 
which direction - increasing or decreasing - however, depends only on specific CO2-emissions 
of the operating plants, i.e. a liberalisation of the electricity market must not auto-
matically lead to a reduction on GHG emissions ! The results of the numerical example are 
summarised in Table 3. 
 
3 Interactions between RES-E generation and liberalised conventional 
electricity market 
In this sector it should be assumed that the government promotes RES-E generation to reduce 
(beside other goals) their national CO2-emissions. More precisely, it will be discussed how 
most important promotion schemes for different RES-E technologies, i.e. a feed-in tariff 
scheme and quota systems with tradable green certificates, interact with the liberalised 
conventional electricity market.8 Special attention will be given to the reduction of the 
national CO2-emissions as well as the costs associated with the different policies.  
3.1 Feed-in tariff 9 
Non-harmonised feed-in tariff and liberalised conventional electricity market 
First, it should be assumed that the national governments introducing national-specific feed- in 
tariffs to increase their national RES-E production. 10 This means that each country offers 
different, non harmonised guaranteed prices for their RES-E generation. The results of these 
strategies are summarised in see Table 4. Totally, the RES-E production increases from 38 
TWh to 140 TWh.  
Table 4: Effects of a guaranteed price for RES -E in a liberalised conventional electricity market to reach a 
‘relative’ unit share of RES -E generation related to the national consumption 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 50,0 64,0 24,0 22,0 160,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 72,6 20,0 26,4 21,0 140,0 
 Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] -12,6 26,0 -10,4 -3,0 0,0 
 CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 46,0 61,6 20,9 19,8 148,3 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 31,00 
 feed-in tariff for RES-E [€/MWh] 100,00 98,00 68,00 69,00  
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 1.340 1.804 686 616 4.446 
costs  RES-E [M€] 4.380 1.627 983 1.351 8.341 
 generation costs  [M€] 5.720 3.431 1.669 1.967 12.787 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 3.090 513 870 164 4.637 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 8.419 4.750 2.217 2.038 17.424 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 76,54 43,18 55,42 50,95 58,08 
 
                                                 
8 Interactions between the different RES-E policies are described in detail in Huber et at (2001b). 
9 To be able to compare the numerical results of with those of the other sections (140 TWh RES-E generation), it 
is assumed that the amount, which can receive a guaranteed feed-in tariff is restricted. Note, this assumption is 
only necessary due to the constant cost curve for the single technologies in the numerical example. In practice, 
observing continuously increasing costs this condition is unnecessary. 
10 Feed-in tariffs permit RES -E producers to feed their electricity into the grid and to receive therefore a 
minimum price (the feed-in tariff), usually for specific period of time. Note: Similar results occur applying other 
price-driven promotion schemes like investment subsidies or tax-relief. 
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Assuming that total demand is constant, any additional RES-E generation will substitute 
conventional electricity generation.11 The reason is that a market separation of RES-E and 
conventional electricity takes place, due to the introduction of such a RES-E strategies. 
Consequently, an active RES-E policy leads to lower CO2-emissions and to a lower spot 
market price for electricity.12  
A lower conventional electricity price, however, does not mean that the consumer auto-
matically gains from the introduction of a RES-E promotion scheme. The reason is that they 
have to bear the additional costs from subsidising RES-E generation. Jensen and Skytte 
(2003) show that it is ambiguous whether the additional cost is  larger than the saved cost. 
Therefore, the consumer costs can either increase or decrease, as a result of introducing a 
promotion scheme. In practise, considering that the cost curve for conventional electricity is 
flat, an increase of the consumer prices can be expected.13 The electricity prices in the single 
countries, however, differ significantly. Note that the electricity price level do not explicitly 
depend on the level of the feed-in tariff (compare country 1 and country 2) but also on the 
actual share of RES-E production. Premium costs are high in countries with a large share of 
RES-E and low in countries with a restricted RES-E generation. Summing up, a feed-in tariff 
set individually and uncoordinated by the national governments leads to distortions 
among the consumers in the countries.  
Due to the higher share of RES-E production, total cost efficiency of the electricity supply 
drops, i.e. total generation costs raises.14  
The situation for the producer is similar to those for the consumer. They can either win or lose 
from the introduction of a RES-E policy. Under the assumption that RES-E cost curve is step 
and conventional margina l generation cost curve is flat –as observable in practise – producer 
surplus will rise, too, compare Table 3 and Table 4.  
In parallel with the change of the production structure, the import / export balances of the 
countries alter too. The distribution of the national conventional electricity reduction is 
independent from the total national RES-E generation. The reason is that the national 
conventional electricity production depends only from the conditions on the international spot 
market (marginal generation plant). 15 As CO2-emissions are related to the power generation 
the same conclusion is valid for the national CO2-reduction: How the total increase in RES-
E generation by itself is distributed upon the  countries has no influence upon the 
realised CO2-reduction in each of the countries. This is totally determined by the marginal 
cost conditions at the  spot market and the specific CO2-emissions of the substituted electricity 
(Morthorst, 2003).16  
Thus, the main result with respect to national climate change policy is: Within a liberalised 
electricity market the deployment of RES-E generation as an important instrument for 
                                                 
11 In the case of price elasticity the occurring substitution rate is a bit lower.  
12 In the numerical model CO2-emissions drops from 192,5 Mt-CO2 to 148,3 Mt-CO2 or 23%. The spot market 
price decreases from 32,5 €/MWh to 31 €/MWh. 
13 In the four country example average consumer prices rises from 32,5 €/MWh to 58,08 €/MWh. 
14 In the model, generation costs rise by approximately 56% to 12.787 Mio. €. 
15 E.g.: the conventional electricity generation in country 1 drops from 95 TWh to 50 TWh due to the lower 
demand for conventional electricity.  
16 A comparison of country 2 and 3 in the numerical example illustrates this fact. While an increase of the RES-E 
generation by 12,4 TWh in country 3 leads to a CO2 reduction of only 3,2 Mt-CO2, a rise in country 2 by 20,0 
TWh results in a CO2 reduction of 13,6 Mt-CO2. 
Note: In contrast to an international power market, separated non-opened national conventional electricity 
markets would lead to an appropriate domestic CO2-reduction. However, under this condition a higher and non-
harmonised power price occur.  
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obtaining significant ly national CO2-reductions cannot be recommended by itself. In 
general, this result stems from the fact that national reduction targets for CO2- 
emissions do not go well together with a liberalised power market. 
The remaining question arises is: Can a harmonised promotion scheme improve the 
unsatisfactory situation for both distortions among the consumer costs and the actual national 
CO2-reduction.  
Harmonised feed-in tariff and liberalised conventional electricity market 
Now the situation will be investigated that all countries agree to harmonise their guaranteed 
feed-in price for RES-E. Assuming that the same quantity of RES-E electricity will be 
generated – otherwise the cases can not be compared - no change in both, the total and the 
national CO2-emissions occurs. This means, despite a harmonised promotion scheme for 
RES-E no homogenous  (national) CO2-reduction benefits among the countries can be 
expected, too. The only certain advantage of a harmonisation of the promotion system on 
the global level is that total generation costs are minimised.17 The reason is that all RES-E 
technologies in all countries receive the same subsidy, so – similar to a trading scheme - only 
most ‘efficient’ technologies are used. 
Table 5: Effects of a harmonised guaranteed price for RES -E / minimum guaranteed price for RES-E 
minimising generation costs in a liberalised conventional electricity market 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 50,0 64,0 24,0 22,0 160,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 48,0 12,0 48,0 32,0 140,0 
 Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] 12,0 34,0 -32,0 -14,0 0,0 
 CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 46,0 61,6 20,9 19,8 148,3 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 31,00 
 feed-in tariff for RES-E [€/MWh] 98,00 98,00 98,00 98,00  
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 1.340 1.804 686 616 4.446 
costs  RES-E [M€] 1.920 843 2.776 2.341 7.880 
 generation costs  [M€] 3.260 2.647 3.462 2.957 12.326 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 2.994 513 1.986 861 6.354 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 6.626 4.214 4.456 3.384 18.680 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 60,24 38,31 111,4 84,60 62,27 
 
The consequences for the producer are ambiguous. While producer in countries with 
increasing feed-in tariff gains compared to the non-harmonised case before, producer with a 
lower harmonised tariff loss.18 The impact of a harmonisation for the consumer is contrary to 
them for the producer. Here consumer in countries with a reduction of the guaranteed feed- in 
tariff gains.19 Note that a homogeneous promotion scheme among the countries must not 
necessarily lead to fewer distortions among the consumer costs in the different countries. 
High costs for the customers occur in those states with a high share of actual RES-E 
generation, i.e. in countries with large cheap RES-E potential.  
Summing up, it can be concluded that - independently if the price driven RES-E promotion 
strategies are harmonised or not internationally - distortions in the RES-E generation and  in 
the national CO2-reduction occurs. In the following section it will be analysed if a market 
instrument, a quota system for RES-E generation in combination with TGCs, fits better in a 
liberalised electricity market reducing national CO2-emissions.  
                                                 
17 In the numerical example, generation costs can be reduced by 3,6%. 
18 In our example producer in country 3 and country 4 win significantly.  
19 In practice, this situation will lead to conflicts pushing or hindering a harmonisation between producers and 
consumers. 
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3.2 Quota system 
Assuming that a quota system with TGCs will be implemented, the following additional 
model conditions are made: 
· free international TGC trade is possible, i.e. it is assumed that all countries have 
accepted the same rules for TGC trading  
· no GHG-credits are attached to the green certificates, i.e. no tradable GHG emission 
allowances (TEA) must be provided with the TGCs. 
The introduction of a quota system leads – similar to a feed-in tariff, where the electricity will 
be feet into the grid at a guaranteed price and is, therefore, not available for the conventional 
power market -  to a market separation between conventional electricity production and RES-
E generation.20 While the demand for the RES-E market is determined by the total quota 
obligation for RES-E, the demand for conventional electricity yields by the difference 
between total demand and the total quota for RES-E. Hence, how the substitution of 
conventional electricity is split upon the single countries is determined by two factors, firstly, 
the total RES-E quota and, secondly, the marginal cost conditions at the spot market. This 
means, how the total RES-E quota by itself is distributed upon the countries has no 
influence upon the realised substitution of conventional electricity, which depends 
totally on the marginal cost conditions at the spot market. As the TGC-systems allow 
international trade of RES-E generation, the actual RES-E development within a country 
depends on the international TGC market price. In other words, the RES-E deployment in 
one country is fully determined by the total (aggregated) quota for all countries, i.e. it is 
independent from the national quota obligation. In addition, the joint TGC-market guarantees 
that only cost efficient RES-E technologies will be used.  
Table 6: Effects of a non-unit and a unit quota system per consumption for RES -E generation in a 
liberalised conventional electricity market 
   Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
  RES-E target [%] 46,7 / 60,0 46,7 / 36,4 46,7 / 75,0 46,7 / 10,0 46,7 / 46,7 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 50,0 64,0 24,0 22,0 160,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 48,0 12,0 48,0 32,0 140,0 
  Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] 12,0 34,0 -32,0 -14,0 0,0 
  CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 46,0 61,6 20,9 19,8 148,3 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 31,00 
  TGC price [€/MWh] 67,00 
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 1.340 1.804 686 616 4.446 
costs  RES-E [M€] 1.920 843 2.776 2.341 7.880 
  generation costs  [M€] 3.260 2.647 3.462 2.957 12.326 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 2.994 513 1.986 861 6.354 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 6.849 / 7.832 6.849 / 6.090 2.491 / 3.250 2.491 / 1.508 18.680 / 18.680 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 62,27 / 71,20 62,27 / 55,36 62,27 / 81,25 62,27 / 37,70 62,27 / 62,27 
 
Most important results of the numerical example are summarised in Table 6 for two cases:  
· country specific obligations, i.e. countries, more ambitious in promoting RES-E (and 
reducing national CO2-emissions) impose a higher quota than more modest countries. 
                                                 
20 In the case of investment subsides, tax relief or guaranteed premium prices for RES-E generation (= premium 
feed-in tariff system as implemented e.g. in Spain) no market separation takes place. Due to the subsidy, 
however, marginal generation costs for RES -E technologies will be reduced by this amount. RES-E must 
compete with conventional power generation at a joint electricity market. In principle, however, the same 
generation structures and costs occur than implementing a feed-in tariff. 
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· unit quota obligation per electricity demand in all countries21  
Independently how the quota allocation looks like, the same generation structure  and 
the same CO2-emissions  occurs as implementing a harmonised feed-in tariff, if the 
guaranteed price is set equal to the spot market price plus the TGC price. In the case that each 
country should fulfil the same RES-E target per consumption, distortions between the 
electricity consumers in the single countries can be avoided.22 Observe that the quota 
allocation has no influence on the producer surplus of the RES-E producer in the 
countries. The reason is that the quota allocation does not influence the actual RES-E 
generation in the countries. 
As already mentioned, independently of the national quota allocation – observe that just the 
total quota for all countries is relevant – both conventional and RES-E generation are 
determined by their marginal cost conditions at their single market (spot price market and 
TGC market). This means that the amount of RES-E generation, the conventional power 
production and the national CO2-emissions  in one country are independent of the RES-
E quota allocation in this country. Even in the case that one country increases the 
internationally agreed total quota autonomously, i.e. the total RES-E quota will be extended, 
only a certain share of both RES-E generation and national CO2- reduction can be gained by 
this country. Thus, the main result of the ambitious RES-E quota setting in one country is that 
they have to share the actual additional RES-E generation as well as the achieved CO2-
reduction with the less ambitious countries. 
Summing up, from the perspective of a national CO2-reduction policy, a separate 
introduction of an international green certificate system into a liberalised electricity 
market cannot be recommended either, if the TGC-market is expected to contribute to 
achieving the national CO2-reduction targets. But of course the development of RES-E 
production in general does contribute to overall international GHG reductions.  
Figure 1 compares the national CO2 reductions, the additional national RES-E generation and 
the resulting specific national CO2 reduction factors due to the substitution of conventional 
power for three cases: 
· non-harmonised feed-in tariff plus national electricity trade 23(left bars) 
· non-harmonised feed-in tariff plus international electricity trade (bars in the middle) 
· international quota system (or equivalent harmonised feed- in tariff) plus international 
trade (right bars) 
It can be seen that, allowing international electricity trade, no distinctions between a feed- in 
tariff and a quota system on a global level exist with respect to both the global CO2-emissions 
                                                 
21 Observe to be able to compare the results, it is assumed that the total RES -E quota remains unchanged in the 
two sub-cases.  
22 Note: According to the ‘RES-E’ directive (European Parliament and Council 2001) a EU-target of 22,1% must 
be fulfilled by 2010. The indicative targets for the single EU member countries are set, however, very different. 
This means, that - assuming an international TGC trading system will be introduced– the consumer in the 
countries are imposed with quite different addition costs for the fulfilment of the national targets. A simulation 
with the model ElGreen (Huber 2001a) show that the premium price varies between 3,6 €/MWh in Belgium and 
53,9 €/MWh in Austria. Assuming a unit quota allocation between the countries (each country has to fulfil a 
quota of 22,1%) the additional costs would be 15,0 €/MWh. 
23 This case is added to illustrate the interactions between the international electricity market and the countries. It 
assumes that a non-harmonised feed-in tariff (as described in the section before) will be granted. Due to the 
national market restriction all additional RES-E generation substitutes national conventional electricity 
production. Note that the turn back of the liberalisation process of the conventional electricity market is currently 
not realistic.  
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and the specific CO2-substitition factor; see bracket total in Figure 1. Observe that they are 
lower in this (specific) example compared to pure national electricity markets.24 With respect 
to the country specific emissions huge differences occur. For example, country 2 gains 
significantly due to the additional RES-E generation in the other countries as indicated by the 
high country-specific CO2-reduction factor. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of national CO2-reduction, additional national RES-E generation and specific CO2-
reductions for the cases no electricity trade and non-harmonised FIT (left), electricity trade and non-
harmonised FIT (middle), and electricity trade and international quota system with TGC (right)  
 
4 Interactions between a CO2 target and the liberalised conventional electri-
city market 
In the previous section it has been analysis that a RES-E strategies – both price-driven 
promotion schemes and a quota system with TGC – can not be adequately contribute to 
reduce national GHG-emissions. Thus a general remedy has to be found. One solution is to 
introduce tradable GHG emission allowance (TEA)-scheme as recently implemented by the 
European Commission (EC, 2001). The idea of a TEA-scheme is to achieve reductions in 
GHG-emissions from the power industry and other energy intensive industries by establishing 
a set of national quotas (allowances) that can be traded both nationally and internationally. 
Hence, GHG-reductions are carried out where it is least costly, because the TEA-system will 
secure a cost-effective utilisation of GHG-reducing options within the industries covered by 
the scheme. 
To simplify the analyses the following additional assumptions are introduced: 
· the TEA-scheme relates only to CO2-emissions  
                                                 
24 Note: This is, however, not generally valid. 
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· the TEA-scheme covers only the power industry, i.e. other energy intensive industries 
are not included25 
· free international TEA trade is possible, i.e. it is assumed that all countries have 
accepted the same rules for TEA trading, e.g. consenting the rules developed in the 
EU trading scheme  
· competitive market conditions, i.e. no distortions due to strategic behaviour of single 
players and / or allocations occur 
The TEA-system is characterised by two important framework conditions, namely 
· the distribution of the total CO2-cap among the single countries, i.e. unit versus non-
unit CO2-target per electricity consumption 
· the allocation of the TEA to the single companies, i.e. free allocation of TEA (grand-
fathering) versus sell of the TEA via an auction 
In the following the effects of these conditions on GHG emissions, the producer and 
consumer will be discussed.26  
Country specific, non-harmonised national CO2-target setting 
It is assumed that each country oblige a national-specific CO2-targets, not relating to the 
actual electricity demand. More precisely, countries with a very ambitious environmental 
policy choose a low (harsh) CO2-target, and countries with a modest interest agree to reduce 
their emission level less (high CO2-target).27 The consequences of this non-harmonised policy 
are summarised in Table 7 for two sub-cases - TEA are allocated sold (via an auction) and 
given for free (grandfathering system), respectively. 
Table 7: Effects of a GHG-target (CO2 emissions < 148,3 Mt -CO2; non-equal GHG-target per electricity 
consumption; TEA allocation via an auction / grandfathering system) for RES -E and conventional 
electricity generation in a liberalised conventional electricity market 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
  GHG target [Mt-CO2] 30,0 80,0 14,0 24,3 148,3 
 free allocation of TEA  [%] 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 65,0 100,0 32,0 48,0 245,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 34,0 0,0 14,0 7,0 55,0 
  Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] 11,0 10,0 -6,0 -15,0 0,0 
  CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 41,0 52,4 24,1 30,8 148,3 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 65,00 
  TEA price [€/t-CO2] 37,00 
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 1.921 3.472 938 1.475 7.806 
costs  RES-E [M€] 1.007 0 140 385 1.532 
  generation costs  [M€] 2.929 3.472 1.078 1.860 9.339 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 1.988 / 3.098 1.089 / 4.049 1.020 / 1.538 577 / 1.476 4.674 / 10.161 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 6.040 / 7.150 4.190 / 7.150 2.082 / 2.600 1.701 / 2.600 14.013 / 19.500 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 54,91 / 65,00 38,09 / 65,00 52,05 / 65,00 42,52 / 65,00 46,71 / 65,00 
                                                 
25 Assuming that the power industry is dominant in terms of CO2-emissions, the inclusion of other industries will 
not change results significantly. 
26 To illustrate the interactions of a TEA -system with the liberalised electricity market again the numerical four 
country example is used. To be able to compare the results gained in the previous sections, it is assumed that the 
same total CO2-emissions should be reached, i.e. the maximum CO2 emission of all four countries is restricted 
by 148,3 Mt-CO2. 
27 In the numerical example total CO2-emissions should be reduced by 23% compared to a liberalised power 
market without any environmental restrictions, compare Table 3. In the numerical example the country specific 
distribution is very ambiguous: Country 1 agrees to reduce their emission by 54%, country 3 by 42%, country 4 
by 11%, and country 2 increases their initial emission level by 6%.  
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Contrary to the cases investigated above, a CO2-target leads to no market separation of 
conventional electricity production and RES-E generation. This means that the total demand 
must be covered by one single market, including both conventional power plants and RES-E 
technologies. However, the marginal generation costs for fossil plants are influences by the 
CO2-restriction. The additional costs, characterised by the TEA-price, are high for plants with 
high specific CO2-emissions (e.g. coal) and low for technologies with low specific CO2-
emissions (e.g. gas). As the emissions refer to the electricity output, the energy efficiency of 
the plants is of importance too. Due to the consideration of the addition CO2-costs the  spot 
market price for electricity raises.28  
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Figure 2: Effects of a non-equivalent GHG-target per electricity consumption assuming that TEA are 
allocated by grandfathering (left) and auction (right) 
 
The total costs the consumers, however, actually have to pay, depend on the allocation of the 
TEAs; see Figure 2.  
Firstly, assuming that the allowances are allocated for free to the producer – as suggested at 
least for 90% of the TEA in the EU-trading scheme – consumers have to pay the spot market 
price for their electricity.29 As the market price is internationally given, the consumers in all 
countries are confronted with the same electricity price. Hence, no distortions between the 
consumers in the different countries occur. Observe that this kind of TEA allocation, 
however, influences the producer surpluses in single countries. For more details see next sub-
section.  
Secondly, supposing that the producers have to purchase the TEA via an auction system the 
state receives high revenue.30 Assume that these revenues will be reimbursed to the 
                                                 
28 In the illustrative example (with a high CO2-restriction) spot market price increases from 32,5 to 65 €/MWh. 
29 In the example consumer have to pay 65 €/MWh, which is more than using a RES -E system to reduce CO2-
emissions! 
30 In the numerical example in total 5487 Mio. € must be paid for the TEAs. This is equivalent to 58% of the 
total electricity generation costs. 
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customers, the electricity price can be reduced. The amount of the reduction depends on the  
national CO2-target. Countries with a harsh emission goal receive less money from the sell of 
the TEAs, because the national amount of TEAs is low. Hence the benefit for the customers in 
these countries is lower compared to customers in countries with a weak CO2-target.31  
Due to the CO2-restriction, total generation costs increases compared with the case of a pure 
liberalised market and no ‘environmental’ restrictions. The increase of total electricity 
production costs, however, is in ever lower than it would be by reaching the same CO2-
target via applying a RES-E strategy. The reason is that all available options to reduce 
CO2-emissions in the electricity supply sector can be used.32 Normally, a certain increase of 
RES-E generation is part of the portfolio of CO2-measures actually carried out. The level of 
the additional RES-E production indicates the efficiency of this kind of measure compared 
with the other CO2-reduction options. If this amount is high, the substitution of conventional 
electricity by RES-E is also an efficiency strategy reducing CO2-emissions.  
Harmonised CO2-target setting 
Now it is assumed that a joint CO2-target – again 148,3 Mt-CO2 in the numerical example – 
should be reached. The total CO2-goal is broken down on the single country level according 
to the national electricity consumption. 33 Most important results are summarised in Table 8.  
The distribution of the national CO2-target has no influence on the actual national CO2-
emissions if the total CO2-cap. In addition, again the marginal conditions at the spot market 
determine how the electricity generation – and hence the CO2 emissions - is distributed 
among the countries. The distribution of the national CO2-targets influences only the gains 
for the produces and consumers , respectively – see Figure 3.  
Table 8: Effects of a GHG-target (CO2 emissions < 148,3 Mt -CO2; equal GHG-target per electricity 
consumption; TEA allocation via an auction / grandfathering system) for RES -E and conventional 
electricity generation in a liberalised conventional electricity market 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
  GHG target [Mt-CO2] 54,4 54,4 19,8 19,8 148,3 
 free allocation of TEA  [%] 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 65,0 100,0 32,0 48,0 245,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 34,0 0,0 14,0 7,0 55,0 
  Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] 11,0 10,0 -6,0 -15,0 0,0 
  CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 41,0 52,4 24,1 30,8 148,3 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 65,00 
  TEA price [€/t-CO2] 37,00 
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 1.921 3.472 938 1.475 7.806 
costs  RES-E [M€] 1.007 0 140 385 1.532 
  generation costs  [M€] 2.929 3.472 1.078 1.860 9.339 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 1.988 / 4.000 1.089 / 3.101 1.020 / 1.752 577 / 1.308 4.674 / 10.161 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 5.138 / 7.150 5.138 / 7.150 1.868 / 2.600 1.868 / 2.600 14.013 / 19.500 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 46,71 / 65,00 
 
                                                 
31 The electricity price in country 1 is 54,9 €/MWh compared to 38,1 €/MWh in country 2.  
32 In more detail, these are: (i) energy efficiency improvements of conventional power plants, (ii) fuel switching 
to primary energy carrier with lower CO2-content per energy output, e.g. a switch from hard coal to gas, and (iii) 
substitution of conventional electricity production by RES -E generation. 
33 Note: Setting the country targets according to the historical CO2-emissions, as negotiated in international 
agreements, will not lead to a harmonised CO2-burden for all consumers! 
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Figure 3: Comparison of non-unit and unit CO2-target per electricity consumption assuming that the TEA 
are allocated for free (grandfathering – orange bars) and auction system (green bars) 
 
With respect to the allocation of TEA the following conclusion can be derived:  
· The allocation of the TEA is important with respect to a harmonisation of inter-
national economic conditions for both producers and consumers. 
· A free allocation (grandfathering system) of tradable GHG emission permits has no 
influence on the consumer costs, but leading to (large) advantages for electricity 
producers (in countries) with less restricted GHG targets compared to generators (in 
countries) with a more restrictive environmental goal. Hence competitive distortions 
in the electricity sector occur implementing a grandfathering system.  
· Applying an auction-system total electricity costs are low for consumers in countries 
with a weak CO2-target compared to consumers in countries with a more restrictive 
goal. The reason is that in the first case more revenues received from selling tradable 
GHG emission permits can be reimbursed (from the state) to the consumer. Hence, 
economic distortions between the consumers in different countries occur, which is of 
especially importance for the competitiveness of the industry. However, in contrast to 
a grandfathering system, an auction has no influence on the competitive situation in 
the electricity generator, because the additional costs due to the GHG restrictions are 
already included in the (rising) conventional electricity price. This means the agreed 
quota of each country leads to no distortions within the electricity supply industry. 
 
5 Interactions between a RES-E market, a tradable GHG allowance market and 
a liberalised power market 
In the section the effects of a simultaneously use of two policy instruments, a RES-E quota 
and a GHG-target, both in combination with tradable certificate, i.e. TGCs for RES-E and 
TEA for GHG-reduction, on the reduction of CO2-emissions will be investigated.34 To be able 
                                                 
34 Similar results arise implementing a feed-in tariff scheme instead of a RES-E quota. 
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to compare the results with those derived in the previous sections, the same model 
assumptions are used with respect to the liberalised electricity market, TGC-scheme and 
TEA-system, respectively. The cases described in the previous sections - i.e. applying a pure 
RES-E and a pure CO2-target - can be understood as the border or corner solutions of the 
coincide use of the two instruments. Table 9 summarises the results of a inner solution 
imposing a total RES-E quota of 80 TWh and a GHG-target of 148,3 Mt-CO2.35  
Table 9: Effects of a RES -E quota (unit share per consumption, Q 1 = 29,33 TWh, Q 2 = 29,33 TWh, 
Q 3 = 10,67 TWh, Q 4 = 10,67 TWh) and a GHG-target (CO2 emissions < 148,3 Mt- CO2; equal GHG-
target per electricity consumption; TEA are allocation via auction /  grandfathering system) for RES-E 
and conventional electricity generation in a liberalised conventional electricity market 
      Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Total 
targets electricity demand [TWh] 110,0 110,0 40,0 40,0 300,0 
  RES-E target [%] 26,7 26,7 26,7 26,7 26,7 
  GHG target [Mt-CO2] 54,4 54,4 19,8 19,8 148,3 
 free allocation of TEA  [%] 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 0,0 / 100,0 
electricity  conventional electricity  [TWh] 60,0 84,0 32,0 44,0 220,0 
generation RES-generation [TWh] 48,0 5,0 20,0 7,0 80,0 
  Import / Export (+/-) [TWh] 2,0 21,0 -12,0 -11,0 0,0 
  CO2-emission [Mt-CO2] 36,0 60,0 24,1 28,2 148,3 
market price spot market price [€/MWh] 50,50 
  TGC price [€/MWh] 17,50 
  TEA price [€/t-CO2] 22,50 
generation conventional electricity  [M€] 1.780 2.492 938 1.331 6.541 
costs  RES-E [M€] 1.920 325 548 385 3.178 
  generation costs  [M€] 3.700 2.817 1.486 1.716 9.719 
effects on  producer surplus  [M€] 1.784 / 3.007 414 / 1.637 948 / 1.393 348 / 793 3.494 / 6.831 
producer / consumer costs [M€] 4.845 / 6.068 4.845 / 6.068 1.762 / 2.207 1.762 / 2.207 13.213 / 16.550 
consumer consumer costs [€/MWh] 44,04 / 55,17 
 
Due to the RES-E quota obligation, total demand must be separated into two parts: Firstly, 
demand for RES-E generation, connected to the TGC-market, and, secondly, demand for 
conventional power, linked to the spot market. Equivalent to the case of a pure TEA-system, 
the additional CO2-costs must be considered in the marginal supply curve for the conventional 
electricity. Now these costs depend on the RES-E obligation too. Generally, the additional 
CO2-costs for conventional power decrease with an increasing RES-E quota obligation. 
The reason is that a higher share of conventional electricity is substituted by CO2-free 
electricity production from RES-E. As the CO2-target is independent from the RES-E quota36, 
the fossil electricity production to cover the (lower) power demand can have higher average 
specific CO2-emissions. In other words, the marginal generation costs for conventional 
electricity generation are a function of the RES-E quota.  
A less ambiguous RES-E policy favours plants with low specific CO2-emissions. As the TEA 
price indicates the scarcity of the good CO2, the TEA market price is high under this 
assumption. Furthermore, as the marginal conventional electricity generation costs (including 
additional CO2-costs) determine the spot market price, the spot market power price is high 
too. The reverse holds if the RES-E obligation is high, i.e. the TEA price and the spot market 
price are low. Figure 4 shows the progress of the TEA, the conventional power price as well 
as the TGC market price in dependency of the RES-E quota. Obviously, the TGC-price 
depends of the RES-E quota. The market price for TGCs rises with the (mandatory) RES-E 
demand for two reasons. First, a higher demand corresponds with higher marginal RES-E 
                                                 
35 Furthermore in the example it is assumed that the total RES-E quota is distributes homogenously among the 
countries per national electricity consumption The effects of a non-uniform distribution are described in the 
section 3 and are in principle valid in this case.  
36 In the numerical example the maximum CO2-level is still 148,3 Mt-CO2. 
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generation costs and, second, the TGC-price increases due to the reduction of the 
conventional electricity price; see Figure 4.37 
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Figure 4: Development of the market prices for conventional electricity, TGC and TEA, the total end-user 
price (costs for consumer), and the marginal production costs of RES-E in dependency of the RES-E 
quota 
 
The costs for the consumer consist of the conventional electricity price and the additional 
costs due to the RES-E obligation. One the one hand the conventional electricity price 
decrease with a higher share of RES-E. On the other hand the additional costs for the 
customers rise proportional with the increase of the national RES-E obligation. 38 Hence, it is 
a priori not clear at which share of RES-E the total cost for the consumer reach a 
minimum.39 The TEAs do not directly affect the consumer costs. The CO2-restriction, 
however, is internalised in a higher conventional electricity price. In addition, the 
allocation of the TEA influences the consumer costs. In the case of an auction system and a 
cost reimbursed from the sell of the TEAs to the customers, consumer costs are lower 
compared to a free allocation of TEAs, see Figure 4 and Figure 5. With respect to the 
allocation of TEAs the reverse holds for the electricity producer. This means, a grandfather 
system leads to (much) higher surplus compared to an auction.  
Total electricity generation costs increases with a higher share of RES-E. The reason is that –
considering only the economic CO2-reduction costs – more efficient options (like efficiency 
improvement or fuel switching) will not be used adequately, due to the distorting promotion 
schemes.  
                                                 
37 Note: TGC-price is given by marginal generation costs minus conventional market price. 
38 Note in the case of a feed-in tariff, a higher national RES-E generation leads to higher consumer costs, too.  
39 In the numerical example the burden for the customers is at the lowest, imposing a RES-E quota of 82 TWh. 
Observe that the total electricity costs jumps, in dependency of the marginal generation cost conditions at the 
spot market and the TGC market. 
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However, beside the cost advantages for the customers that can be occur due to the promotion 
of RES-E, renewables has other assets too.40 In addition, in the long-run, RES-E generation 
may be a better answer to the climate problem and to a sustainable energy system than the 
adaptation of conventional electricity plants. Hence, to secure the development of RES 
technologies a separate promotion scheme for RES - beside pure climate change policy – 
makes sense.  
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Figure 5: Development of the total generation cost, total producer surplus and total in dependency of the 
RES-E quota 
 
6 Conclusions 
The paper analysis the interactions of three markets, the conventional power market, a market 
for tradable green certificates (TGCs) and a tradable emissions allowances (TEA)-market in 
relation with a GHG-target. The investigations are focused on two aspects. 
· Reduction of national CO2-emission  
· Cost effects for both producer and consumer  
Most important conclusions with respect to national CO2 emission reductions are: 
· independently from the design of the RES-E quota allocation, the same generation 
structure and the same CO2-emissions occurs as implementing a harmonised feed- in 
tariff, if the guaranteed price is set equal to the spot market price plus the TGC price 
· if the main objective of the policy-goal is to reduce national CO2-emission, neither the 
use of national price-driven RES-E support schemes nor the introduction of a TGC-
system into a liberalised power market can be recommended.  In contrary to them, 
ambiguous RES-E policy in separated non-opened national power markets would lead 
                                                 
40 For example: increased diversity of national power supply, increased security of supply, avoided pollution 
form “conventional” electricity generation, added value of developing new industries (e.g. new jobs, service 
skills, diversity of the rural employment, export and manufacturing capacity). 
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to an appropriate domestic CO2-reduction. However, under this condition a higher and 
non-harmonised power price occur. 
· countries most ambitious in implementing RES-E technologies will only partly be 
gaining the CO2-reduction benefits themselves in an international environment – 
independently from RES-E the support scheme. This means, the ambitious countries 
will support the less ambitious ones in achieving their GHG-reduction targets; e.g. in a 
TGC-system most ambitious countries will have to buy certificates from the less 
ambitious ones to fulfil their TGC-quotas, although this only contributes to achieving a 
national target for renewable development, not in reaching their national CO2 
reduction targets. 
· a combination of an TEA-market and a TGC-system is seen to be efficient in 
contributing in achieving the national CO2 reduction targets if a close co-ordination of 
the two instruments is undertaken at least at the national level: More precisely, when 
the RES-E production (of independent producers) is increased, the national CO2-target 
(for the conventional power generators) should be decreased correspondingly. Thus, if 
it is a prerequisite that RES-E generation contributes to achieving national GHG-
reduction targets, then the combination of these two markets might be the right 
solution. It should be mentioned that the achievement of the expected CO2 reduction, 
however, might be expensive for the consumer and / or society.  
The key conclusions with respect to generation structure, costs for producer and consumer, 
respectively are: 
· a non-harmonised feed- in tariff usually leads to distortions among the additional costs 
imposed on the electricity customers in the different countries. A harmonisation of the 
feed-in tariff must, however, not necessarily lead to fewer economic distortions. High 
costs for the customers occur in states with a high share of actual RES-E generation, 
i.e. in countries with large cheap RES-E potential. One (certain) advantage of a 
harmonised promotion system (on global level) is that total RES-E generation costs are 
minimised; 
· the distribution of the total RES-E quota influences the cost for customers. In countries 
with a high quota consumer are burdened with high additional electricity costs. In the 
case that each country fulfil the same RES-E target per national electricity 
consumption, distortions among the electricity consumer can be avoided. The quota 
allocation, however, has no influence on the producer surplus of the RES-E producer 
in the countries; 
· a support scheme for RES-E can, but must not lead to higher total electricity costs (for 
the consumer). Due to the market separation the conventional power price drops. If 
this gain will be overcompensated due to the additional costs for RES-E generation or 
not depends on the marginal conditions of both conventional power and RES-E; in 
contrast, a GHG-target ever drives the total consumer costs upwards; 
· under the assumption that a certain GHG-level must be reached, total consumer costs 
can be minimised by setting both a RES-E quota and a CO2-target. By a 
simultaneously use of both instruments the market prices for TGCs, TEAs and 
conventional electricity can be influenced in a way that the producer surplus can be 
reduced compared to both a pure GHG-reduction scheme target and a pure RES-E 
policy respectively, leading to lower total consumer costs; 
· however, an introduction of a RES-E quota in addition to a given CO2-restriction is 
counterproductive with respect to the total electricity generation costs. This means, a 
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sole CO2- target, neglecting any certain share of RES-E, minimise production costs for 
electricity generation. The reason is that by introducing an additional RES-E quota the 
flexibility in choosing more cost efficient CO2-reduction measures is restricted; 
· the allocation of TEAs - independently if in combination with or without a RES-E 
promotion scheme - is important with respect to an harmonisation of international 
economic conditions for both producers and consumers. 
+ a free allocation of TEAs has no influence on the consumer costs, but leading to 
(large) advantages for electricity producers (in countries) with less restricted GHG 
targets compared to generators (in countries) with a more restrictive environmental 
goal. Hence competitive distortions in the electricity sector occur ;  
+ an auction of TEAs has no influence on the competitiveness in the power industry, 
because the additional costs due to the GHG restrictions are already included in the 
(rising) conventional electricity price. Under the assumption that the government 
reimburses the revenue gained from the sell of the TEAs to the consumer, 
consumer costs can be (significantly) reduced. However, electricity costs are low 
for consumers in countries with a less restrictive GHG target compared to them in 
countries with a harsher goal due to higher reimbursements. Hence, economic 
distortions between the consumers in different countries occur, which is of 
especially importance for the competitiveness of the industry. 
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